97130 2003-03-29 20:26 /202 rader/ Claus Assmann <ca+announce@sendmail.org>
Importerad: 2003-03-29 20:26 av Brevbäraren
Extern mottagare: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Extern mottagare: vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <4246>
Ärende: sendmail 8.12.9 available
------------------------------------------------------------
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Sendmail, Inc., and the Sendmail Consortium announce the availability
of sendmail 8.12.9. It contains a fix for a critical security
problem discovered by Michal Zalewski whom we thank for bringing
this problem to our attention. Sendmail urges all users to either
upgrade to sendmail 8.12.9 or apply a patch for your sendmail version
that is part of this announcement. Remember to check the PGP
signatures of patches or releases obtained via FTP or HTTP (to check
the correctness of the patches in this announcement please verify
the PGP signature of it). For those not running the open source
version, check with your vendor for a patch.
We apologize for releasing this information today (2003-03-29) but
we were forced to do so by an e-mail on a public mailing list (that
has been sent by an irresponsible individual) which contains
information about the security flaw.
For a complete list of changes see the release notes down below.
Please send bug reports to sendmail-bugs@sendmail.org as usual.
Note: We have changed the way we digitally sign the source code
distributions to simplify verification: in contrast to earlier
versions two .sig files are provided, one each for the gzip'ed
version and the compressed version. That is, instead of signing the
tar file, we sign the compressed/gzip'ed files, so you do not need
to uncompress the file before checking the signature.
This version can be found at
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.9.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.9.tar.gz.sig
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.9.tar.Z
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.9.tar.Z.sig
and the usual mirror sites.
MD5 signatures:
3dba3b6d769b3681640d0a38b0eba48c sendmail.8.12.9.tar.gz
19e39c9e9bc8fae288245c546639e1f4 sendmail.8.12.9.tar.gz.sig
268fc4045ba3eac6dfd9dc95d889ba5f sendmail.8.12.9.tar.Z
19e39c9e9bc8fae288245c546639e1f4 sendmail.8.12.9.tar.Z.sig
You either need the first two files or the third and fourth, i.e.,
the gzip'ed version or the compressed version and the corresponding
.sig file. The PGP signature was created using the Sendmail Signing
Key/2003, available on the web site (http://www.sendmail.org/) or
on the public key servers.
Since sendmail 8.11 and later includes hooks to cryptography, the
following information from OpenSSL applies to sendmail as well.
PLEASE REMEMBER THAT EXPORT/IMPORT AND/OR USE OF STRONG
CRYPTOGRAPHY SOFTWARE, PROVIDING CRYPTOGRAPHY HOOKS OR EVEN JUST
COMMUNICATING TECHNICAL DETAILS ABOUT CRYPTOGRAPHY SOFTWARE IS
ILLEGAL IN SOME PARTS OF THE WORLD. SO, WHEN YOU IMPORT THIS
PACKAGE TO YOUR COUNTRY, RE-DISTRIBUTE IT FROM THERE OR EVEN JUST
EMAIL TECHNICAL SUGGESTIONS OR EVEN SOURCE PATCHES TO THE AUTHOR
OR OTHER PEOPLE YOU ARE STRONGLY ADVISED TO PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO
ANY EXPORT/IMPORT AND/OR USE LAWS WHICH APPLY TO YOU. THE AUTHORS
ARE NOT LIABLE FOR ANY VIOLATIONS YOU MAKE HERE. SO BE CAREFUL, IT
IS YOUR RESPONSIBILITY.
SENDMAIL RELEASE NOTES
$Id: RELEASE_NOTES,v 8.1340.2.132 2003/03/29 14:02:26 ca Exp $
This listing shows the version of the sendmail binary, the version
of the sendmail configuration files, the date of release, and a
summary of the changes in that release.
8.12.9/8.12.9 2003/03/29
SECURITY: Fix a buffer overflow in address parsing due to
a char to int conversion problem which is potentially
remotely exploitable. Problem found by Michal Zalewski.
Note: an MTA that is not patched might be vulnerable to
data that it receives from untrusted sources, which
includes DNS.
To provide partial protection to internal, unpatched sendmail MTAs,
8.12.9 changes by default (char)0xff to (char)0x7f in
headers etc. To turn off this conversion compile with
-DALLOW_255 or use the command line option -d82.101.
To provide partial protection for internal, unpatched MTAs that may be
performing 7->8 or 8->7 bit MIME conversions, the default
for MaxMimeHeaderLength has been changed to 2048/1024.
Note: this does have a performance impact, and it only
protects against frontal attacks from the outside.
To disable the checks and return to pre-8.12.9 defaults,
set MaxMimeHeaderLength to 0/0.
Do not complain about -ba when submitting mail. Problem noted
by Derek Wueppelmann.
Fix compilation with Berkeley DB 1.85 on systems that do not
have flock(2). Problem noted by Andy Harper of Kings
College London.
Properly initialize data structure for dns maps to avoid various
errors, e.g., looping processes. Problem noted by
Maurice Makaay.
CONFIG: Prevent multiple application of rule to add smart host.
Patch from Andrzej Filip.
CONFIG: Fix queue group declaration in MAILER(`usenet').
CONTRIB: buildvirtuser: New option -t builds the virtusertable
text file instead of the database map.
Portability:
Revert wrong change made in 8.12.7 and actually use the
builtin getopt() version in sendmail on Linux.
This can be overridden by using -DSM_CONF_GETOPT=0
in which case the OS supplied version will be used.
Instructions to extract and apply the patches for sendmail:
The data below is a uuencoded, gzip'ed tar file. Store the data
between "========= begin patch ========" and "========= end patch
==========" into a file called "patch.sm" and apply the following
command:
uudecode -p < patch.sm | gunzip -c | tar -xf -
This will give you these files (explanation for each file is on
the left, only "prescan.VERSION.patch" are the files).
prescan.8.12.8.patch only for 8.12.8, changes version string to
8.12.8p1 prescan.8.12.patch for 8.12.0 - 8.12.7, does not change
version string prescan.8.11.6.patch only for 8.11.6, changes
version string to 8.11.6p2 prescan.8.11.patch for 8.11.0 - 8.11.5,
does not change version string prescan.8.9.3.patch only for
8.9.3, changes version string to 8.9.3p2 prescan.8.9.patch for
8.9.0 - 8.9.2, does not change version string
Apply the appropriate patch to your version of the sendmail source
code (change the version number below to the right one!), e.g.,
cd sendmail-8.12.8/sendmail
patch < prescan.8.12.8.patch
recompile sendmail, and install the new binary.
========= begin patch ========
begin 644 prescan.tar.gz
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RXML parse error: Unknown scope "(V@-H!7".
| &(V@-H!7.\UXKP);
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========= end patch ==========
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(97130) /Claus Assmann <ca+announce@sendmail.org>/(Ombruten)
Kommentar i text 97137 av Dan Harkless <bugtraq@harkless.org>
97137 2003-03-29 23:08 /23 rader/ Dan Harkless <bugtraq@harkless.org>
Importerad: 2003-03-29 23:08 av Brevbäraren
Extern mottagare: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <4252>
Kommentar till text 97130 av Claus Assmann <ca+announce@sendmail.org>
Ärende: Re: sendmail 8.12.9 available
------------------------------------------------------------
Claus Assmann <ca+announce@sendmail.org> writes:
> We apologize for releasing this information today (2003-03-29) but
> we were forced to do so by an e-mail on a public mailing list (that
> has been sent by an irresponsible individual) which contains
> information about the security flaw.
[...]
> SECURITY: Fix a buffer overflow in address parsing due to
> a char to int conversion problem which is potentially
> remotely exploitable. Problem found by Michal Zalewski.
> Note: an MTA that is not patched might be vulnerable to
> data that it receives from untrusted sources, which
> includes DNS.
Since this was publically disclosed before a patch was available, I'm
sure a lot of people would be interested in knowing whether attempts
to exploit this are detectable in the syslog in sendmail's default
configuration.
--
Dan Harkless
bugtraq@harkless.org
http://harkless.org/dan/
(97137) /Dan Harkless <bugtraq@harkless.org>/(Ombruten)
97136 2003-03-29 22:57 /359 rader/ Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@ghettot.org>
Importerad: 2003-03-29 22:57 av Brevbäraren
Extern mottagare: bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Mottagare: Bugtraq (import) <4251>
Ärende: Sendmail: -1 gone wild
------------------------------------------------------------
CVE: CAN-2003-0161
CERT: VU#897604
********************************************************
*** FORCED RELEASE -- VENDOR NOTIFIED AS OF 03/18/03 ***
********************************************************
There is a vulnerability in Sendmail versions 8.12.8 and prior. The
address parser performs insufficient bounds checking in certain
conditions due to a char to int conversion, making it possible for an
attacker to take control of the application. This problem is not
related to the recent ISS vulnerability announcement.
The impact is believed to be a root compromise. I've confirmed this
is a local issue, and my initial impression is that a remote attack
possibility is not that unlikely. Only platforms with 'char' type
signed by default are vulnerable as-is, and little endian systems
would be easier to exploit. Systems that use Sendmail privilege
separation are safer against the _local_ attack, but even then it is
still possible to compromise the smmsp account and control the
submission queue.
The bug lurks in parseaddr.c in prescan() function, which, in certain
conditions, will run past the buffer size limit and overwrite stack
variables, reaching to and past the stored instruction pointer
itself. This function is called quite generously accross the code
for processing e-mail addresses.
It is possible for the attacker to repeatedly skip the length check
location in this function because of an unfortunate construction of a
"special" control value check. A special value, NOCHAR, is defined as
-1. There is a variable 'c', also used to store last read character,
declared as int, and the variable will be sometimes assigned the
value of NOCHAR to indicate a special condition.
Unfortunately, the input character - type char - defaults to a signed
type on many modern platforms, and ASCII value 0xff ((char)-1) will
be converted to 0xffffffff ((int)-1) upon assignment. This makes
character 0xff indistinguishable from NOCHAR after being stored in
'c', and makes it possible for the attacker to spoof NOCHAR and skip
the length check.
Since precise control of the overwrite process is possible (length,
offset and layout are up to the attacker), even though the values are
mostly fixed, it is reasonable to expect that this vulnerability will
be easy to exploit on little endian systems. Even on big endian
systems, it might be still possible to alter important control
variables on the stack, and you are generally advised to upgrade.
I've notified the vendor on March 18, and got a response on the next
day. Sendmail is releasing version 8.12.9, and the official notice
is as follows:
Sendmail, Inc., and the Sendmail Consortium announce the
availability of sendmail 8.12.9. It contains a fix for a critical
security problem discovered by Michal Zalewski whom we thank for
bringing this problem to our attention. Sendmail urges all users
to either upgrade to sendmail 8.12.9 or apply a patch for your
sendmail version. Remember to check the PGP signatures of patches
or releases obtained via FTP or HTTP (to check the correctness of
the patches in this announcement please verify the PGP signature of
it). For those not running the open source version, check with
your vendor for a patch.
SECURITY: Fix a buffer overflow in address parsing due to
a char to int conversion problem which is potentially
remotely exploitable. Problem found by Michal Zalewski.
Please visit http://www.sendmail.org for more details and patches,
and check with your vendor for the availability of a new or patched
package.
--
------------------------- bash$ :(){ :|:&};: --
Michal Zalewski * [http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx]
Did you know that clones never use mirrors?
--------------------------- 2003-03-19 00:21 --
[ http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/photo/current ]
Mister Trouble never hangs around
When he hears this Mighty sound:
"Here I come to save the day!"
That means that Mighty Mouse is on the way!
Yes sir, when there is a wrong to right
Mighty Mouse will join the fight
On the sea or on the land
He gets the situation well in hand
So though we are in danger
We never despair
'Cause we know that where there's danger
He is there!
He is there! On the land! On the sea! In the air!
We're not worryin' at all
We're just listenin' for his call:
"Here I come to save the day!"
That means that Mighty Mouse is on the way!
Mr. Trouble never hangs around
When he hears this mighty sound...
"Here I come to save the day!"
That means that Mighty Mouse is on the way.
Yessir when there is a wrong to right
Mighty Mouse will join the fight
On the sea or on the land
He gets the situation well in hand
So though we are in danger
We never despair
Cause we know that where there's danger
He is there!
He is there!
On the land!
On the sea!
In the air!
We're not worryin' at all
We're just listenin' for his call
"Here I come to save the day!"
That means that Mighty Mouse is on the way!
(97136) /Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@ghettot.org>/(Ombruten)